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THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
THE FIRST 125 YEARS
Kenneth A. Plevan*
INTRODUCTION
There is no question that the Second Circuit has had a significant
influence on the development of U.S. intellectual property law, especially
copyright law, and the reasons are evident. Historically, many of the
business segments for which intellectual property rights were key assets, or
at the heart of the endeavor, were concentrated in the New York area,
including television, music, advertising, publishing, and theater.
Regardless of the reasons, it is inarguable that the Second Circuit has had
a profound impact on copyright law. Judge Learned Hand’s decision in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.1 helped define for later generations the
fundamental idea/expression dichotomy. The transformative use doctrine,
which dates from a 1990 influential article by then-District Judge Pierre N.
Leval,2 has not been without its critics, but its continued importance has
been reaffirmed in the court’s 2015 decision in Author’s Guild v. Google,
Inc.3 (Google Books). Other leading decisions have helped write the rules
of the road for the e-commerce era, both in the copyright and trademark
contexts. For trademarks, the Second Circuit was the first federal circuit to
craft a multifactor test for likelihood of confusion,4 an approach adopted in
time by all circuits. In another universally followed decision, the court set
forth the standards for the degrees of mark distinctiveness.5 In the Lanham
Act advertising area, Second Circuit decisions helped define the role of
survey evidence in determining whether and when advertising messages
* Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Harvard College, 1966; Harvard Law
School, 1969; member of the New York Bar. The author acknowledges with great
appreciation the invaluable contributions by the following attorneys: the author’s colleague
Douglas Nemec was principally responsible for the section discussing patent cases, which
incorporated suggestions from the author’s former colleague David Hansen; Richard Dannay
and J. Christopher Jensen of the law firm of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman offered guidance
on the selection of copyright cases and offered helpful comments on the draft; the author’s
former colleague Xiyin Tang, now at Mayer Brown LLP, and colleague David Lamb
contributed greatly to all aspects of this Article.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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that might be considered literally truthful are nevertheless actionable as
impliedly false.6 One leading Second Circuit case was the first to recognize
a right of publicity,7 and another continues to guide the direction of this
important intellectual property doctrine today.8
In addition to the traditional categories of copyright, patent, and
trademark law, intellectual property law encompasses a range of distinct
substantive areas. For example, the right of publicity, albeit a creation of
state statutory law, is generally considered an area of intellectual property
and is covered in this article. Law school catalogs9 usually include trade
secret law within the purview of intellectual property, but because trade
secret issues often arise in employment disputes, this subject has not been
included.10
I. COPYRIGHT LAW
For many years, leading Second Circuit decisions have helped define and
invigorate all principal aspects of copyright law. Based on a quantitative
analysis of published copyright decisions cross-referenced to decisions
discussed in copyright case books, Professor William Ford observed in
2006 that “[o]verall, the Second Circuit is the clear leader in terms of
experience and influence.”11 The article concluded that “the Second and
Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court and the Southern District of
New York, are the most influential courts in the development of copyright
law.”12
Similarly, an article published in the 1991 St. John’s Law Review pointed
out that several Second Circuit judges testified in 1990 at joint
congressional hearings on the issue of copyright fair use.13 The author
observed that, as of that time,
[t]he Second Circuit is widely recognized as the nation’s most important
copyright court. Centered in the capital city of publishing and the arts,
and mindful of the proud tradition of copyright scholars who have formed

6. See Am. Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978).
7. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
8. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
9. The information about law school classes was obtained from the course lists of four
law schools. See Class Schedules and Registration, U. CHI. L. SCH., https://
classes.uchicago.edu (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P7KH-7E5X]; Course
Catalog, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4X7C-MDU8]; Course Catalog, STAN. L. SCH., https://
www.law.stanford.edu/courses (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M29L-CARQ];
Course Descriptions, NYU SCH. L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2016) [https://perma.cc/XF89-8YP8].
10. More recently, cyberlaw and digital privacy have become common subjects of law
school classes falling within the catalog definition of intellectual property, but these are
subjects of too recent origin to warrant inclusion.
11. William K. Ford, Judging Experience in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41
(2006).
12. Id. at 41–42.
13. James H. Carter, They Know It When They See It: Copyright and Aesthetics in the
Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 773, 773 n.1 (1991).
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its treasure of precedent, the court regularly hears appeals raising issues in
the forefront of copyright developments.14

Professor David Nimmer, a widely known copyright scholar, has referred to
the Second Circuit as the “Copyright Specialists.”15
This part starts with Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,16 a decision by
Judge Learned Hand widely cited in academic circles as one of the leading
cases in U.S. copyright history. Addressing the fundamental issue of the
ideal/expression dichotomy, Nichols helped frame the fundamental scope of
copyright protection. Other leading Second Circuit decisions have set
standards for copyrighting computer software, developed principles
applicable in the protection of the online marketplace, and established the
highly influential principle of transformative use as an essential element of
a fair use analysis.
A. Standards for Determining Copyright Infringement
The discussion begins, appropriately, with the all-important
idea/expression dichotomy, then addresses the use of experts in copyright
infringement analyses and copyright standards for computer software.
1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Nichols is one of the earliest decisions from the Second Circuit to discuss
the copyright concepts underlying the fundamental doctrines of the
idea/expression dichotomy and scenes à faire. The appeal was heard by
Judges Learned Hand, Thomas W. Swan, and Augustus N. Hand, with the
opinion written by Judge Learned Hand.
The plaintiff, Anne Nichols, was a playwright who had achieved great
success with her first Broadway play Abie’s Irish Rose (the subject of the
lawsuit).17 The primary defendant was Universal Pictures Corporation
(now known as Universal Studios), the film studio that had produced a
motion picture entitled The Cohens and Kellys.18 Both plot lines dealt with
marriage between young adults from families of different religions
(Catholic and Jewish) and the comedic consequences of such unions.19
Abie’s Irish Rose became a commercial hit and went on to become, at
that time, the longest running Broadway production ever (a distinction it
held for fourteen years).20 Similarly, The Cohens and Kellys enjoyed
14. Id. at 773.
15. See David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003).
16. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
17. Id. at 120.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 120–21.
20. See Paul Mrozka, Broadway Long Runs: How New York Became Home to the Long
Run, BROADWAY SCENE (May 17, 2013), http://broadwayscene.com/broadway-long-runshow-new-york-became-home-to-the-long-run/ [https://perma.cc/943C-N4BZ]. Indeed, the
show’s touring company held the record for the longest running touring company for nearly
forty years. See Abie’s Irish Rose, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=
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significant commercial success and spawned five sequels between 1928 and
1933.21 These two works appear to have captured the spirit of America as
an ethnic melting pot. As the decision pointed out, the basic themes and
characters presented in the two works were, in that era, the subject of
numerous plays, books, films, and radio programs.22
Plaintiff’s copyright infringement lawsuit sought an injunction and an
accounting of profits.23 In ruling for the defendants, the district court had
held that although there were clear similarities between the two works, and
clear evidence that defendants copied certain aspects of the plaintiff’s play,
nothing that the defendants took from the plaintiff’s work was
copyrightable.24 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal,
holding that whatever features defendants may have taken from Abie’s Irish
Rose were not copyrightable elements but were instead general and
unprotected concepts.25
The court began with a detailed description of the general plot and story
elements of each work.26 It then explained that while copyright must
protect literary works beyond direct copying, at some point of abstraction
the line is crossed between a protectable expression of an idea and the basic
idea itself, which is not protected by copyright.27 This discussion presents
one of the earliest and clearest descriptions in copyright law of the nowfamiliar idea/expression dichotomy.
The court ultimately found that the similarities between the two works—
including feuding Irish and Jewish families, young lovers secretly marrying,
and ultimate reconciliation—exemplified only general ideas that could not
be protected by copyright.28 On the issue as to whether the plaintiff’s
characters were copyrightable, and to what extent (if any) the defendants’
comparable characters constituted infringement, the court concluded that,
for the most part, in both works the characters were little more than stock
figures, demonstrating common and well-known characteristics that were
not original to either party.29 This discussion reflected an early depiction of
what is now known as the scènes-à-faire doctrine.

Abie%27s_Irish_Rose&oldid=729973360 (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UY7
7-N5QN].
21. THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN PARIS (Universal Pictures 1928); THE COHENS AND
KELLYS IN ATLANTIC CITY (Universal Pictures 1929); THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN SCOTLAND
(Universal Pictures 1930); THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN AFRICA (Universal Pictures 1930);
THE COHENS AND KELLYS IN TROUBLE (Universal Pictures 1933).
22. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121–22.
23. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff’d, 45
F.2d 119.
24. Id. at 148.
25. See generally Nichols, 45 F.2d 119.
26. See id. at 120–21.
27. See id. at 121.
28. See id. at 121–23.
29. See id. at 122.
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The Nichols decision has been cited over 325 times by state, federal, and
even foreign courts, and in over 1,100 secondary sources.30 It is also
widely admired among both scholars and practitioners for the poetic quality
of language describing and explaining important legal principles. For
example, in summing up one of the fundamental components of copyright
protection, Judge Hand stated, in frequently quoted language, that “[i]t is of
course essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations.”31 In explaining the foundation for the “abstraction”
test, Judge Hand noted that
“[u]pon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out . . . but
there is a point in this series of abstractions where [the concepts] are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of
his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.”32

And, in discussing the idea/expression dichotomy, the opinion aptly
observed that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can.”33
One notable aspect of Nichols is that the panel appeared to be wholly
uninfluenced by what could be fairly characterized as bad facts. The record
in the district court showed that the defendants originally attempted to
purchase motion picture rights to Abie’s Irish Rose, that the screenwriters
for The Cohens and Kellys studied a synopsis of Abie’s Irish Rose while
writing The Cohens and Kellys, and that when the film was being released,
Universal Pictures proudly proclaimed that it would “be to the screen what
‘Abie’s Irish Rose’ is to the stage.”34 The Second Circuit panel was not
distracted by the intent evidence from the application and development of
important copyright legal principles.
2. Continued Influence of Nichols
The importance of Nichols can be seen not only in how often it has been
cited, but also in the types of cases it has influenced. For instance, the
Second Circuit relied on Nichols in its decision in Williams v. Crichton.35
Similar to Nichols, Williams involved accusations that a popular novelturned-film infringed the copyright of an earlier work—in Williams a series
of children’s books.36
Plaintiff in Williams filed a lawsuit against several individuals and
companies connected to the Jurassic Park film and novel, including both
30.
Next.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

This figure comes from the “Citing References” tab of the Nichols case on Westlaw
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
Id.
Id.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 581.
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Steven Spielberg and Michael Crichton.37 The plaintiff had written a series
of children’s books about a dinosaur zoo and claimed that the Jurassic Park
works appropriated protected elements from his stories.38 Relying on
Nichols and its progeny, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge James
L. Oakes, held that the only similarities between the plaintiff’s stories and
the Jurassic Park film and novel were scènes-à-faire elements that were
necessarily inherent in the idea of a dinosaur zoo.39 Williams is also
notable for declaring that the test for substantial similarity and copyright
infringement is the same for works intended for child audiences as those for
adult audiences.40
3. Role for Experts in Copyright Disputes
Another Second Circuit bedrock case on resolving copyright
infringement issues is Arnstein v. Porter,41 which involved accusations of
copyright infringement for musical compositions.42 The district court had
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that no issue
of material fact remained after reviewing the depositions of both parties and
listening to recordings of the musical pieces at issue.43
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jerome N. Frank, principally
considered two important issues: (1) the appropriate role of experts in
copyright infringement cases and (2) what questions should be left for the
finder of fact to resolve.44 On the first issue, the court divided its analysis
into the two elements necessary to maintain a copyright infringement
action: (1) whether there had been copying and (2) whether the copying
constituted infringing appropriation.45 Because evidence of direct copying
(or a defendant admitting that he or she copied a work) was likely to be
unavailable, the court permitted expert testimony on the issue of striking
similarity, so that a plaintiff more easily could establish that a defendant
likely copied at least a portion of the copyrighted work.46
At the same time, the court rejected the position that expert testimony
was permissible on the second prong of copyright infringement, i.e., the
question of whether the defendant’s copying amounted to impermissible
infringement.47 Here, the court held that to establish infringement, a
plaintiff would need to show that the pieces are so similar to a lay listener
as to be “inexcusably alike.”48 Therefore, expert testimony on the issue of
37. See id.
38. See id. at 582.
39. See id. at 587–89.
40. See id. at 589.
41. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
42. See id. at 467.
43. Arnstein v. Porter, No. 29-754, 1945 WL 6897, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1945),
rev’d, 154 F.2d 464.
44. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468–69.
45. See id. at 468.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 473.
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impermissible copying (as distinct from whether copying occurred as a
factual matter) was extremely limited and only allowed where the experts
were testifying on the issue of the lay reaction to the works.49
Arnstein has been cited almost 600 times in judicial decisions and more
than 750 times in secondary authorities. On the expert issue, Arnstein
followed up on dicta from Nichols, where Judge Learned Hand had ended
the decision by lamenting the use of experts in that case as well, expressing
the hope that expert testimony on the issue of infringement would be
excluded entirely in the future.50 While the use of experts on the issue of
substantial similarity is rare today, it is generally considered proper in two
areas: (1) music cases and (2) software cases.51
The principles set forth in Arnstein are still valid today, but many
copyright claims are nevertheless rejected on summary judgment.52
Copyright infringement claims also have been defeated on a motion to
dismiss,53 which is not surprising since the complaint must cite the
copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work,54 thereby putting both
works before the district court on a motion challenging the legal sufficiency
of the pleading.
4. Copyright and Computer Software
Computer software presents challenging copyright law issues, as the
courts attempt to strike a balance between rewarding programmers with
sufficient copyright protection and encouraging innovation in the software
field. A principal analytical framework for determining the scope of
copyright protection afforded to computer software is the three-part
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test formulated in Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.55
The dispute in Altai arose out of two functionally similar computer
programs developed by different companies.56 Greatly simplifying the
facts, Computer Associates (CA) developed ADAPTER, a successful
“operating system compatibility” program that allowed its job scheduling
program, CA-SCHEDULER, to function on different operating systems.57
The defendant, Altai, developed its own compatibility software, OSCAR

49. See id.
50. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
51. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10[c]
(rev. ed. 2015).
52. See, e.g., Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2014)
(discussing architectural designs).
53. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64
(2d Cir. 2010).
54. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51, § 12.09.
55. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
56. See id. at 698–700.
57. See id. at 698–99.
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3.5, which performed in a similar fashion.58 CA contended that OSCAR
3.5 infringed its copyright in ADAPTER.59
Altai prevailed in the district court, with the court concluding that
because ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 were only similar in their user-facing
behavior rather than in their coding, the two programs were not
substantially similar in form.60 CA appealed, arguing that the district court
erred by failing to find copyright protection for the nonliteral, structural
elements of ADAPTER, such as its general flow charts, intermodular
relationships, parameter lists, and macros.61
In an opinion written by Judge John M. Walker, the Second Circuit
compared and contrasted computer software to other types of copyright
protected works.62 At the outset, the court noted that copyright protection
generally extends beyond a literary work’s textual form to nonliteral
elements of expression.63 However, the court cautioned that the utility of
software makes more difficult the task of distinguishing protectable,
nonliteral expression and nonprotectable, general ideas.64 In their entirety,
computer programs are more than singular ideas—software is made up of
subprograms, each embodying a discrete idea and organized in a specific
form. But these component parts coalesce into a process, a nonliteral
element arguably beyond the bounds of copyright protection.
To balance these competing interests, the Second Circuit panel borrowed
from well-established copyright doctrines to fashion the “abstractionfiltration-comparison” test.65 In the “abstraction” prong, the court parsed
the software into its component parts.66 Using the abstraction test
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols as a guide, the court divided
OSCAR 3.5 into four parts: source and object code, parameter lists,
services required, and outlines.67
After the constituent parts were identified, the test proceeded to the
“filtration” prong, which requires the removal of all nonprotected
component parts.68 An element is nonprotectable if it is in the public
domain or if it is an idea, rather than an expression of an idea.69 An
example of an unprotected idea within software is the link set in the desktop
taskbar. Linked options such as “File,” “Edit,” and “View” are examples of
expression dictated by efficiency rather than creativity. In short, the taskbar
“idea” is so closely linked to its expression and so vital as a building block
58. See id. at 700.
59. See id.
60. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 554, 560–62 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
61. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 701–02.
62. See id. at 702–12.
63. See id. at 701.
64. See id. at 702–12.
65. See id. at 706.
66. See id. at 706–07.
67. See Id. at 714 (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 554,
560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
68. See id. at 707–10.
69. See id. at 707.
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in future program creation that it does not warrant copyright protection.
Thus, in Altai, the court filtered out most of ADAPTER’s component parts
as nonprotectable because their expression was incident to the idea, a result
of efficiency rather than creative expression.70
After “abstraction” and “filtration,” one is left with the protectable
expression of the software—the “golden nugget.”71 The “comparison”
prong compares the remaining expressive elements of the plaintiff’s
program with the allegedly infringing elements of the defendant’s
program.72 Finding that Altai did not copy any of the protectable elements
of ADAPTER, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.73
The continuing influence of Altai is evident in the recent, significant
decision in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.74 At issue in that dispute
between two technology giants was the copyrightability of certain packages
of source code first developed by Oracle and used in the operating system
of the popular Android mobile devices.75 In a comprehensive opinion, the
Federal Circuit, citing to Altai nearly a dozen times, relied heavily on the
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test, pointing out that the test was first
“formulated by the Second Circuit and expressly adopted by several other
circuits.”76
B. Copyright and Fair Use:
The Transformative Use Doctrine
One of the most profound influences of the Second Circuit on U.S.
copyright law is seen in the development of the transformative use doctrine.
Often a determinative aspect of the fair use analysis, the doctrine was first
proposed in an influential article by Second Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval,
then a district court judge.77
The fair use defense generally serves to resolve the inherent tension
between protecting intellectual property rights of artists and protecting the
First Amendment rights of others to speak freely about, criticize, and
comment on existing works. The rights to copyright protection and
freedom of expression are on equal constitutional footing, as Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to promote
the progress of science and arts by granting creators limited monopolies
over their works.78

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 707–10.
See id. at 710–11.
See id. at 710.
See id. at 721.
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See id. at 1347–48.
Id. at 1357.
See Leval, supra note 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The fair use doctrine was ultimately codified in the Copyright Act of
1976.79 Although transformative use is not referred to in the statute, and its
development postdates its adoption, it has become an integral part of the
fair use analysis. A few years following the publication of Judge Leval’s
article, the Supreme Court cited it throughout one of its most well-known
fair use decisions, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.80 The Court
expanded upon Judge Leval’s original conception of transformative use,
which had been based on the first fair use factor, holding that “[t]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”81
Following the Campbell decision, the Second Circuit has identified
transformative use as the primary issue to be considered when determining
whether a second use satisfied the object of copyright law to stimulate
creativity, rather than merely being a repackaging and republishing of the
original. One such case is Blanch v. Koons,82 where the defendant artist
used the plaintiff’s photograph as part of a commissioned work.83 The
photograph, depicting a woman’s feet in high-fashion sandals, with metallic
nail polish, resting on a man’s lap in a first-class airplane cabin, had been
published in Allure magazine accompanying a feature about metalliccolored cosmetic products.84 The defendant used this and several other
photographs to create a collage of four pairs of legs dangling over images of
confections, with a grassy field and Niagara Falls in the background.85 The
work incorporating the photograph was part of a larger exhibition, the
purpose of which (according to the defendant) was to critique and comment
on “consumer culture” and the consequences of society’s obsession with
mass media.86
In the opinion in Blanch, authored by Judge Robert D. Sack, the court
focused on the vastly different purposes of the two works, as well as the
intent of the defendant’s use of the photograph as a means of expressing
comment and criticism, in finding that the defendant’s work was
sufficiently transformative to constitute a fair use.87 The court held that the
defendant’s purpose and use of the work (i.e., as part of a large art
exhibition critiquing aspects of society) were entirely different from those
of the plaintiff (i.e., as part of a lifestyle magazine supporting and glorifying
those same aspects of society and culture).88
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,89 decided four months
before Blanch, involved a 480-page coffee table book cataloging the career
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012).
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 579.
467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 246.
See id. at 247–48.
See id. at 248.
See id.
See id. at 251–53.
See id. at 252–53.
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
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and cultural impact of the band The Grateful Dead.90 The book had a
timeline running continuously throughout, which told the band’s history
chronologically and included several images that complemented and
provided visuals for the text.91 Of the over 2,000 images included in the
book, seven were of works copyrighted by the plaintiff (six were images of
concert posters and one was an image of concert tickets).92
In an opinion authored by Judge Jane A. Restani (then-Chief Judge of the
U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation), the Second
Circuit panel upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment
dismissing the claim, relying heavily on the transformative nature of the
defendant’s use of the works in question.93 The court held that the
defendant’s use of “thumbnail” reproductions of the plaintiff’s protected
works was sufficiently transformative to constitute a fair use.94 The court
contrasted the plaintiff’s original use of the works as a means for providing
the public with general concert information and promoting the band through
artistic expression with the defendant’s use of the works as a tool to
enhance the readers’ understanding of the biographical and historical text in
the book.95
Bill Graham Archives and Blanch illustrate two aspects of the
transformative use doctrine. It can apply either (1) where the original work
has been transformed in some significant way to make a statement (as in
Blanch) or (2) where the original work remains unchanged, but is used in an
entirely different context, thereby transforming the purpose and meaning of
the work (as in Bill Graham Archives).
Transformative use is not without its limits. For instance, in Salinger v.
Colting,96 in an opinion by Judge Guido Calabresi, the court concluded that
an unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger’s classic novel The Catcher in the
Rye was not sufficiently transformative to qualify as a fair use.97 Despite
the defendant’s arguments that his intent in writing the sequel, entitled 60
Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, was in part to parody and comment
on Salinger himself (who appears as a minor character in the novel), the
court held that the work was primarily nontransformative as a straight
sequel to Catcher in the Rye.98
There is no question that the transformative use doctrine has had a
significant impact on copyright jurisprudence.99 Judge Leval’s article itself
90. See id. at 607.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 608–12, 615.
94. See id. at 611.
95. See id. at 609–10.
96. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
97. See id. at 83–84.
98. See id. at 71–72.
99. Cases outside the Second Circuit applying the transformative use doctrine to
copyright disputes include: Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175–78 (9th Cir.
2013); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 939–41 (4th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2319 (2014); and Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc.,
342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d Cir. 2003).

154

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

has been cited over 900 times.100 A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit
questioning the doctrine is discussed in the next section.101
C. Transformative Use in the Digital Age:
The Google Books Decision
In the fourth quarter of 2015, the Second Circuit handed down its latest
landmark copyright decision in Authors Guild v. Google Inc.,102 a decadeold litigation referred to informally as “Google Books.” There, the Second
Circuit reaffirmed the central role that transformative use plays in the fair
use analysis. The complaint in Google Books challenged two projects
undertaken by technology giant Google, Inc.—the Google Library Project
and the Google Books Project.103 Through these two projects, Google
made unauthorized digital copies of tens of millions of books that had been
submitted by major libraries for that purpose.104 Google then used the
digital scans to establish a publicly available free search engine whereby
users could determine whether certain books contained a specified word or
term, as well as review “snippets” of text showing the context of the use.105
Google also allowed the participating libraries to download and retain
digital copies of the books that they had submitted, provided that the
libraries committed to not using the digital copies in violation of copyright
law.106
In September 2005, authors and a membership organization to which
they belonged filed a copyright infringement lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and a putative class of impacted authors.107 After extensive
negotiations, the parties proposed a class-wide settlement, which Judge
Denny Chin rejected as unfair, inadequate, and unreasonable.108
The plaintiffs subsequently filed for class certification, and Google
countered with a motion to dismiss.109 In May 2012, the district court
denied Google’s motion to dismiss and granted the individual plaintiffs’
motion for class certification.110 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit
set aside the grant of class certification, noting that the resolution of
Google’s fair use defense could potentially moot many of the class
certification issues, and therefore that question should be decided first.111
On the parties’ subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge
Chin (who had in the interim been appointed to the Second Circuit but
100. This figure comes from the “Citing References” tab for the article on Westlaw Next,
which lists 986 secondary sources.
101. See infra Part I.C.
102. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
103. See id. at 206–07.
104. See id. at 207.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
108. Id. at 686.
109. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
110. See id. at 395.
111. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013).
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elected to retain the case) held that Google’s copying constituted fair use.112
On the authors’ appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s grant
of summary judgment, focusing on the transformative nature of the Google
Book and Library projects.113
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Leval, the author of the 1990
seminal law review article introducing the concept of transformative use to
copyright law discussed above,114 relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,115 as well as leading fair
use cases from other circuits, including A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC,116 and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.117 Focusing
on the purpose and character of the Google Books Project as a tool for users
to determine what books contain the information they are seeking, the court
noted that the purpose of Google’s copying was to “make available
significant information about those books,” and that such activity was “a
quintessentially transformative use . . . [as] the result of a word search is
different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message from the
page (and the book) from which it is drawn.”118
In so ruling, the court was careful to note that while the copying at the
center of these projects was clearly covered by fair use, other aspects of the
projects, particularly the “snippet” display and the use of the digital copies
by the libraries, were fair specifically based on the record before it.119
Thus, in a “copyright dispute [which] tests the boundaries of fair use,”120
the court limited key parts of its holding to the facts before it and declined
to comment on whether some other use of the digital copies by Google or
the libraries would also be considered sufficiently transformative to be
fair.121
The court in Google Books addressed the importance of the
transformative character of Google’s use in evaluating each of the four
statutory factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.122

112. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
113. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2015).
114. See supra note 77.
115. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
116. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
117. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); see Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 212–23.
118. See Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 217 (quoting Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755
F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014)).
119. See id. at 217–18.
120. Id. at 206.
121. See id. at 229.
122. See id. at 212–14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)).
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For instance, even though Google copied the entirety of the authors’ works,
which typically would counsel against a fair use finding under factor three
(the amount and substantiality of the portion copied), the court noted that
the extent of permissible copying is directly related to the purpose of the
work.123 Because Google’s purpose was to provide information about the
books, including how many times a particular word or phrase was used in
those books, the court found that copying the entirety of the work was the
only way to accomplish this purpose.124 Similarly, under the fourth factor
(the effect of the use on the potential market), the court held that because
Google’s copying served an entirely different purpose than the original
works, there was little risk that the market for the original works would be
impacted.125
Several courts outside of the Second Circuit had recently questioned the
usefulness of the transformative use concept. Most significantly, in Kienitz
v. Sconnie Nation LLC,126 a Seventh Circuit panel rejected the application
of the doctrine (while still upholding the fair use defense), noting that it is
not included in the statutory fair use factors and asserting that its
application runs the risk of eliminating copyright holders’ exclusive right to
produce derivative works.127 In particular, the panel noted its disagreement
with another recent Second Circuit decision, Cariou v. Prince,128 which had
held that a transformative use did not need to comment on the original
work.129
In a footnote in the Google Books opinion, and in other parts of its
analysis as well, the panel responded to the Seventh Circuit’s position,
positing that the concerns identified by the Seventh Circuit could be
avoided if courts refrained from broad interpretations of the term
“transformative” and instead focused on the jurisprudence inherent in the
concept.130 Judge Leval offered that the transformative use principle serves
as a helpful guidepost for addressing a difficult and complex topic and that
the four-factor test in the statute was never meant to be exclusive, but rather
it was meant to be a framework for the courts to use in developing and
applying the fair use doctrine on a case-by-case basis.131
Because Google Books was not decided on a class-wide basis, it is
theoretically possible for another group of authors to assert similar claims
against Google in another circuit. Notwithstanding the disagreement
between the Seventh and Second Circuits over Cariou and the application
of the transformative use doctrine, it seems unlikely the Seventh Circuit (or
panels from any other circuit) would take issue with the outcome in Google
Books. Moreover, as the district court decision in Google Books was
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 221–23.
See id.
See id. at 223–25.
766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015).
See id. at 758.
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
See Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 216 n.18.
See id. at 213.

2016]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

157

authored by Judge Chin, the opinion actually represents the unanimous
view of four Second Circuit judges. Thus, Google Books should secure the
role of the transformative use analysis in copyright jurisprudence for the
foreseeable future.
D. Responsibilities of Online Service Providers
to Eliminate Infringement
In 2012, the Second Circuit interpreted key provisions of the 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protecting online service
providers from copyright infringement liability. In Viacom International,
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,132 in an influential opinion written by Judge José A.
Cabranes, the court held that for there to be secondary liability, service
providers must have knowledge or awareness of specific and identifiable
instances of infringement on their websites. But the court also held that
service providers could not avoid such knowledge (and liability) by means
of “willful blindness.”133 The court also held that the DMCA requires a
high standard of control for vicarious liability, encompassing only those
providers that are closely involved with their users’ activities.134 The
court’s decision is likely to have a lasting impact on the policies and
practices of copyright owners and service providers alike.
Viacom filed suit against YouTube in 2007, “alleging direct and
secondary copyright infringement based on the public performance, display,
and reproduction of their audiovisual works on the YouTube website.”135
At the same time, the Premier League, an English soccer association, also
filed a putative class action against YouTube for copyright infringement,
and the cases were consolidated.136 This clash between well-known
entertainment and sports entities over developing e-commerce business
models led to an intensely watched case in the district court, which granted
summary judgment for the defendant.137
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal but upheld many of
YouTube’s positions.138 The court first addressed whether 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(A) requires that an online service provider have knowledge of
specific and identifiable infringements or if general knowledge was
sufficient to find liability.139 The court looked to the statutory language,
which provides that in the absence of actual knowledge of infringing
activity, an online service provider is not liable if it does not have “red flag”
knowledge, meaning that it is “not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.”140 The court concluded that
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 34.
See id. at 36–38.
See id. at 28.
See id. at 28–29.
See id. at 29–30.
See id. at 41–42.
See id. at 32.
Id. at 30; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
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knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity was necessary to
incur liability because expeditious removal of infringing material is possible
only if the service provider knows precisely which items to remove.141
The court further held that the provider could not avoid specific
knowledge through “willful blindness.”142 On this issue, the court
recognized that 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) does not require service provider
monitoring of users’ activities.143 However, the statute is silent on
“deliberate effort[s] to avoid guilty knowledge,” or willful blindness.144
And, because the statute does not explicitly address the doctrine of willful
blindness, it does not abrogate it.145
The court also addressed liability based on receipt of financial benefit
attributable to infringing activity that the service provider has the “right and
ability to control.”146 Finding that importing a common law definition of
vicarious liability would render the DMCA “internally inconsistent,” the
court held that the statute “requires something more than the ability to
remove or block access” to infringing content on the service provider’s
website.147 Although defining the contours of that elevated standard is
difficult, the court suggested that “exerting substantial influence” on the
activities of users could constitute the extra element necessary to find a
service provider liable.148
The decision in Viacom was immediately recognized as landmark
precedent. Just a few months before the Second Circuit decision, the Ninth
Circuit addressed similar questions on the limits of service provider
protection in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC.149
Although that court’s interpretation of the DMCA differed slightly from the
Second Circuit’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit issued a superseding opinion in
2013 in light of Viacom.150 Viacom has also been followed by a number of
district courts outside the Second Circuit.151
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for the
defendant.152 The ultimate result may encourage media companies to offer
reasonable licenses. Online service providers, moreover, cannot be
141. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 30–32.
142. See id. at 34–35.
143. See id. at 35.
144. Id. (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 36; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2012).
147. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC,
821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
148. Id.
149. 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011), superseded on reh’g, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
150. See UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d 1006; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the defendant liable under the theory of
red flag knowledge set out by the Second Circuit).
151. See, e.g., BWP Media USA Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, No. 14-cv-00467-PABKMT, 2015 WL 1538366 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1154 (10th Cir.
Apr. 29, 2015); Square Ring, Inc. v. Doe-1, No. 09-563 (GMS), 2015 WL 307840 (D. De1.
Jan. 23, 2015); Disney Enters, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013).
152. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

2016]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

159

oblivious to infringement on their website. Rather, to avoid the allegation
of willful blindness, they are encouraged to implement mechanisms to
streamline the process by which copyright owners can notify them of
specific infringing content to expedite removal. Thus, to minimize
infringement in developing online business models without overly
inhibiting that development, the Second Circuit opinion envisions a
responsibility shared between copyright owners and service providers.
More recently, in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,153 the Second
Circuit addressed an important question of first impression regarding the
proper interpretation of the safe harbor provision of the DMCA. As
discussed above, the DMCA establishes a safe harbor from liability for
“infringement of copyright” for online service providers that lack actual or
“red flag” knowledge of infringing uses.154 In Capitol Records, the court
addressed, among other issues, whether this statutory safe harbor applies to
all “infringement of copyright,” including infringement of nonpreempted
state copyright law.155
In that case, the owner of the copyright in several pre-1972 sound
recordings brought claims for direct, secondary, and vicarious copyright
infringement against Vimeo, an Internet service provider that allows users
to post videos to its website.156 Although federal copyright law protects
sound recordings made after February 15, 1972, and thus the DMCA safe
harbor clearly applies to those recordings, any sound recordings made
before that date are protected, if at all, only by state copyright law.157
Vimeo argued that the safe harbor should also extend to protect Internet
service providers from liability for violating state copyright laws.158 The
district court disagreed, holding that § 512 of the DMCA did not apply to
pre-1972 sound recordings, as those recordings are protected by state, not
federal, law.159 On Vimeo’s motion to reconsider, the district court
certified the question to the Second Circuit.160
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the DMCA’s safe harbor did in
fact apply to state copyright infringement claims.161 In a unanimous
opinion authored by Judge Pierre N. Leval, the Second Circuit panel
focused primarily on the language of § 512(c), which releases a service
provider from liability for “infringement of copyright” if certain
requirements are satisfied.162 While the district court (and the Copyright
Office in a 2011 report addressing the issue)163 had interpreted the phrase
153. Nos. 14-1048/1049/1067/1068, 2016 WL 3349368 (2d Cir. June 16, 2016).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
155. Capitol Records, 2016 WL 3349368, at *1–2.
156. Id. at *5.
157. Id. at *6.
158. Id.
159. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
160. Capitol Records, 2016 WL 3349368, at *5.
161. Id. at *15.
162. Id. at *6–10.
163. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS (Dec. 2011), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [https://
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“infringement of copyright” to mean a violation of federal copyright,164 the
Second Circuit disagreed, noting that no definition of infringement exists in
the Copyright Act, and therefore a “literal and natural reading of the text of
§ 512(c) leads to the conclusion that its use of the phrase ‘infringement of
copyright’ does include infringement of state laws of copyright.”165
In reaching its decision, the court explained the compromise represented
by the DMCA safe harbor: in exchange for relief of liability from
infringement about which they had no knowledge, Internet service
providers are obligated to promptly remove infringing works upon
notice.166 Excluding works protected only by state copyright would defeat
the statutory purpose of having a safe harbor: “Service providers would be
compelled either to incur heavy costs of monitoring every posting to be sure
it did not contain infringing pre-1972 records, or incurring potentially
crushing liabilities under state copyright laws.”167
The Second Circuit’s holding is noteworthy in part because it rejected the
Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 512(c).
Judge Leval first
acknowledged that “we do recognize the Copyright Office’s intimate
familiarity with the copyright statute and would certainly give appropriate
deference to its reasonably persuasive interpretations of the Copyright Act”
but then declined to adopt its interpretation because in matters of statutory
interpretation, the court need not defer to a governmental agency.168 In
addition, the decision implicitly rejected the conclusions of a New York
appellate court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc.169
There, the court held that the DMCA and its safe harbor only apply to post1972 recordings, relying on Congress’s express “directive in . . . the
Copyright Act that nothing in the Act would ‘annul’ or ‘limit’ the commonlaw copyright protections attendant to any sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972.”170
The Second Circuit’s holding in Capitol Records also is noteworthy
because it continues the circuit’s approach of protecting the free flow of
information on the internet and the growth of innovative technology
companies. Thus, the decision in Capitol Records can be seen as a natural
extension of the Second Circuit’s holding in Viacom, and further reinforces
the view that copyright holders should not be allowed to avoid the
protections Congress afforded Internet service providers in the DMCA. If
the case had been decided differently, liability for unauthorized copies of
pre-1972 recordings could have imposed a significant burden on Internet
service providers, including compliance and litigation costs as well as
possible adverse damage verdicts.
perma.cc/MU76-UNGB]; see also Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37 (relying on
that report).
164. See Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37.
165. Capitol Records, 2016 WL 3349368, at *8.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *10.
169. 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 2013).
170. Id. at 108.
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Given the panel’s sound and well-documented reasoning regarding the
purpose and legislative history behind the DMCA, one can predict with
confidence that other federal courts will follow suit if and when similar
cases are initiated.
E. Industrial Design and Conceptual Separability
The Second Circuit redefined the contours of the conceptual separability
doctrine in the landmark case Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Examining conceptual separability both under the
Lumber Co.171
Copyright Act of 1976 and as set forth in prior decisions, Judge James
L. Oakes established a new approach clarifying the line between
copyrightable expression and utilitarian function. Addressing whether a
bicycle rack, adapted from a minimalist sculpture, was copyrightable, the
court concluded that because the bicycle rack reflected a “merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations,” the artistic aspects were not
conceptually separable from the function, and therefore the useful article
was not copyrightable.172 This influential decision has limited the scope of
copyright protection for industrial design.
One of the owners of Brandir, the plaintiff, had created an original wire
sculpture from “one continuous undulating piece of wire” and later
translated the sculpture into a bicycle rack.173 The lawsuit challenged a
competitor’s right to produce similar racks.174 Since the defendant could be
liable for copyright infringement only if it had appropriated protected
expression, whether copyright law protected the rack was the primary issue
in the dispute.175 The court noted that the Copyright Office had denied
Brandir’s application for registration because the bicycle rack lacked any
element that was “capable of independent existence as a copyrightable
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the shape of the useful
article.”176
The court analyzed both the legislative history of the Copyright Act of
1976 as well as case law defining conceptual separability.177 According to
the Act, a useful article is copyrightable “if, and only to the extent that, [its]
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.”178 The legislative history added that an
artistic element could be separable conceptually as well as physically.179 In
addition, the opinion addressed and sought to reconcile two previous

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1146.
See id. at 1143.
See id. at 1143–46.
Id. at 1146.
See id. at 1143–46.
Id. at 1143 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
See id.
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Second Circuit cases, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,180 and
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.181
In Kieselstein-Cord, also authored by Judge Oakes, the court had held
that a stylized belt buckle was conceptually separable, even if not physically
separable, and thus qualified for copyright protection.182 Noting that the
buckle was worn as jewelry and displayed in museums, the KieselsteinCord court held that the function of the buckle was secondary to its
ornamental purpose.183 However, in Barnhart, in an opinion by Judge
Walter R. Mansfield, the court had found that mannequins were not
copyrightable because none of the design elements were conceptually
separable.184
Seeking to reconcile these earlier holdings, Judge Oakes cited a
Minnesota Law Review article by Professor Robert C. Denicola that had
argued that copyrightability of useful articles “ultimately should depend on
the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by
functional considerations.”185 The court translated Denicola’s test into “the
language of conceptual separability”: only design elements that reflect
artistic judgment entirely independent of functional influences are
conceptually separable.186 At the same time, any elements that were
influenced at all by functional considerations are not separable.187
According to the court, this approach was consistent with previous case
law, in that the design of the belt in Kieselstein-Cord had no functional
purpose whatsoever, whereas the mannequin forms in Barnhart were
crafted for their utilitarian function.188
Applying the test to the bicycle rack in Brandir, the court held that the
rack was not copyrightable.189 Though adapted from a sculptural work of
art, the rack itself was a product of functional constraints, as the form of the
sculpture had been altered to make the rack useful.190
Brandir has been applied by several other federal courts of appeals.191
The Brandir conceptual separability doctrine sets a high bar for industrial
designers seeking copyright protection, as any consideration of function in
the design process jeopardizes copyright protection. Perhaps for this

180. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
181. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
182. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94.
183. See id. at 993.
184. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 424–26.
185. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987);
see also Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983).
186. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1144.
189. See id. at 1146.
190. See id. at 1147.
191. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041 n.2 (9th Cir
2014); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494
(4th Cir. 1996).
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reason, other courts have applied modified, more lenient standards of
copyrightability.192
F. International Copyright Disputes and Choice of Law
Given that federal law has exclusively governed copyright in the United
States for decades, it is unsurprising that there are a few choice-of-law
decisions in copyright jurisprudence. However, as world commerce
expanded in the 1990s, and technological advances made it easier than ever
to access—and to copy—creative works from other countries, U.S. federal
courts faced choice-of-law issues in copyright infringement cases involving
cross-border disputes.
One influential discussion on this topic is found in the Second Circuit’s
decision by Judge Jon O. Newman in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc.193 Itar-Tass involved a claim by Russian publishers,
news services, and journalists alleging copyright infringement of numerous
news articles that an American newspaper and its publisher had copied in
their weekly paper.194 Because the defendants conceded wholesale
copying, the court considered only whether plaintiffs owned a valid
copyright in the works and, if so, whether the copyright had been
infringed.195
The primary issue the court addressed in Itar-Tass was which
jurisdiction’s law should govern the issues of ownership and
infringement.196 Russian copyright law explicitly excluded newspaper
articles from the “work-made-for-hire” doctrine, meaning that if Russian
law applied, the copyright in the articles was owned by the Russian
journalists; if U.S. law applied, the copyright was owned by their
employers.197
The court held that the law of the jurisdiction where the copyrighted
work was created should generally apply to the issue of copyright
ownership.198 More specifically, the court noted that copyright, as a type of
intellectual property, should be treated like any other form of property.199
Thus, the usual choice-of-law rule for property—that the jurisdiction with
the “most significant relationship” to the property will provide the
governing law—should apply to questions involving intellectual property
ownership.200 Conversely, the court held that the question of whether

192. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 930–31 (7th
Cir. 2004) (noting that, although informed by the Brandir-Denicola test, the definition of
conceptual separability rests on whether an object’s artistic elements can be conceptualized
as existing independently of its utilitarian function).
193. 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
194. See id. at 84–85.
195. See id. at 84.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 90–91.
199. See id. at 90.
200. See id.
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infringement has occurred is governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the alleged infringement took place, consistent with tort law.201
Itar-Tass has been cited in First,202 Fifth,203 Ninth,204 and Eleventh205
Circuit opinions. Nimmer on Copyright has dedicated an entire section to
the Itar-Tass decision and its lasting effects on choice of law in copyright
cases, in the United States and in other jurisdictions as well.206
G. Joint Authorship
Who is, or is not, a joint author of a copyrighted work can be a
contentious issue, especially if a work is financially valuable. The
Copyright Act of 1976 defines a “joint work” as a “work prepared by two
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”207 Because joint
authorship entitles coauthors “to equal undivided interests in the whole
work,” each coauthor enjoys the “right to use or to license the work as he or
she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner
for any profits that are made.”208
In two cases decided in the 1990s, the Second Circuit addressed joint
authorship in decisions that became leading precedents on this issue. In the
earlier of the two cases, Childress v. Taylor,209 Judge Jon O. Newman
established a two-prong standard for determining—in the absence of any
written agreement addressing the issue—“when a contributor to a
copyrighted work is entitled to be regarded as a joint author.”210 The court
determined that a more “stringent inquiry than the statutory language” was
required to avoid “extend[ing] joint author status to many persons who are
not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress.”211
The Childress decision involved accusations of copyright infringement
by playwright Alice Childress against actress Clarice Taylor.212 Taylor had
persuaded Childress to compose a script profiling the life of comedienne
Jackie “Moms” Mabley, with Taylor to play the lead role.213 During the
script-writing process, Taylor contributed a number of factual findings
about the life of Mabley and suggested a number of scenes.214 Childress
201. See id. at 91.
202. See Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan, 499 F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir.
2007).
203. See Indusoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, 560 F. App’x 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2015); Alameda
Films S.A. de C.V. v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp., 331 F.3d 472, 476 n.6 (5th Cir.
2003).
204. See Foad Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001).
205. See Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011).
206. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51, § 17.05[B].
207. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
208. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998).
209. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 501.
211. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (quoting Childress, 945 F.2d at 507).
212. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 501–02.
213. See id. at 502.
214. See id.
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obtained a copyright for the play in her name alone.215 When Taylor staged
a production with a revised script authored by another playwright, Childress
sued for copyright infringement, and Taylor asserted joint ownership.216
The court upheld a grant of summary judgment for Childress, concluding
that Taylor’s contributions never “evolved into more than the helpful advice
that might come from the cast, the directors, or the producers of any
play.”217 The court concluded that notwithstanding Taylor’s contributions,
“Childress was responsible for the actual structure of the play and the
dialogue.”218 In so holding, the court established a two-part test to address
joint authorship, with the intention of the parties as its cornerstone,
requiring that (1) each putative joint author make independently
copyrightable contributions to the work and (2) there be an intention that
they be coauthors.219 While the first prong had precedents, the second
prong was an innovation often referred to as the “Childress rule of mutual
co-authorship intent.”220
The Childress joint authorship test has influenced decisions in the First
and Seventh Circuits, as well as the District of Puerto Rico.221 The Ninth
Circuit has incorporated the Childress test into its own joint authorship
test.222 In a 1999 district court decision in Louisiana, the court held that
“[s]ince the Fifth Circuit has yet to delineate a stance on the elements for
finding joint authorship under § 101, this [c]ourt will follow the excellent
analysis of the Second Circuit.”223
The Second Circuit decision in Thomson v. Larson,224 authored by Judge
Guido Calabresi, also made significant contributions to joint authorship law
by elaborating on the Childress test and cataloging factual inquiries that
could prove relevant to the application of the standard. Thomson involved a
dispute over joint ownership of the Broadway production of Rent.225
Larson, a playwright, hired Thomson, a dramaturg, to help refine the
storyline.226 Just after the final dress rehearsal, Larson tragically died.227
The show became a commercial success and Thomson later sued the Larson
estate, claiming that she was a coauthor.228

215. See id.
216. See id. at 504.
217. Id. at 509.
218. Id. at 502.
219. See id. at 506–08.
220. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1998).
221. See Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 151 (1st Cir. 2015); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre,
Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir.1994); Cabrera v. Teatro del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp.
743, 764 (D.P.R. 1995).
222. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000).
223. BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 (E.D. La. 1999).
224. 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
225. See id. at 196.
226. See id. at 197–98.
227. See id. at 198.
228. See id.
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The court found that Thompson did make copyrightable contributions,
but it held that there was no mutual coauthorship intent.229 The dramaturg
had no decision-making authority, she had neither sought nor was billed as
a coauthor, and Larson had entered into contracts as the sole author.230 The
record also showed that Larson repeatedly rejected hiring a book writer.231
On these facts and others, the Second Circuit held that there was no intent
to be joint authors, and therefore Thompson’s claim did not meet the
Childress test.232
In total, more than one-half of the length of this intellectual property
Article is devoted to Second Circuit copyright decisions. While the court’s
particular prominence in this field may not be as pronounced today as in the
past, recent decisions such as those in Viacom and Google Books show that
the Second Circuit’s accumulated experience and expertise will continue to
influence the future direction of copyright law as new technologies emerge.
II. LANHAM ACT ISSUES
The title to this part refers to the Lanham Act, not trademark law, for
convenience of organization. The Lanham Act covers at least three
somewhat distinct substantive areas:
trademark, dilution, and
advertising.233 The discussion begins with Judge Henry J. Friendly’s 1976
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.234 decision, one of the
most influential Second Circuit decisions in the intellectual property field,
dealing with the classification of the degrees of distinctiveness of marks.
Fifteen years earlier, the court, also in an opinion by Judge Friendly,
articulated the first of the multifactor tests for confusion, an approach
adopted and applied in all federal circuits.235
A. Classification of a Term for Trademark Eligibility
It is widely accepted today that to determine whether a term can be
protected as a trademark, one typically begins with an analysis of the four
Abercrombie & Fitch categories of distinctiveness.236 These range from a
mark that has the highest level of inherent distinctiveness (fanciful or
arbitrary) to a term that can never be protected as a trademark (generic).237
A common way to explain the hierarchy is to reference the word “apple.”
When used to describe the fruit, the word is generic. When used to describe
a pie or cake made from the fruit, the term is descriptive. When used in
229. See id. at 205.
230. See id. at 203–05.
231. See id. at 204–05.
232. See id. at 206–07.
233. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141–1141n (2012).
234. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
235. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
236. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (“Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly
reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, [the four
categories] are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”).
237. See id.
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“Apple-a-Day” for vitamin tablets, the mark is suggestive—enough
inherent strength to qualify for trademark protection without more. When
used to refer to computers, the term is arbitrary and has the highest degree
of inherent strength.238
Why are they referred to as the Abercrombie & Fitch categories? In
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Judge Henry J. Friendly articulated what the
Supreme Court has referred to, not once, but twice, as the “classic” test or
formulation for evaluating the distinctiveness of a word mark.239 Judge
Friendly’s organization and description of the four categories—arbitrary,
fanciful, suggestive, and generic—has been cited in over 800 court
decisions as well as in the leading treatises.240
The dispute in that case arose in a lawsuit by Abercrombie and Fitch
(A&F) against competitor Hunting World (HW) for alleged infringement of
several of A&F’s registered trademarks using the word “Safari” for sporting
apparel.241 Between the late 1930s and the filing of the lawsuit, A&F had
continuously used “Safari” in connection with men’s and women’s
apparel.242 HW counterclaimed, arguing that “Safari” was a generic
term.243
In the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Friendly began by setting forth the
distinctiveness framework—arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and
generic—and discussing the differing scopes of protection afforded to each
category.244 Turning to the facts in the case, the court concluded that (1)
“Safari” was a generic term when used in connection with particular types
of clothing and marketing tactics and (2) as applied to boots and shoes,
“Safari” was suggestive or “merely descriptive” and was a protectable
trademark, even if “merely descriptive,” because it had become
incontestable.245 However, in light of the lower court’s findings, HW had a
valid defense of fair use under section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, where
HW’s use of “Safari” for boots was purely descriptive because “[w]hen a
plaintiff has chosen a mark with some descriptive qualities, he cannot
altogether exclude some kinds of competing uses even when the mark is
properly on the register.”246 Thus, the facts of the dispute gave Judge
Friendly the opportunity not only to set forth and explain commonly used
trademark law principles but also to apply those principles to a complex set
of facts and illustrate how they worked in practice.

238. See, e.g., 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:2 (4th ed. 2015).
239. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2000); Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
240. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 238, § 11:2.
241. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 7–8.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 9.
245. See id. at 11–12.
246. Id. at 12.
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B. Multifactor Tests to Evaluate the
Likelihood of Confusion Issue
Whether the alleged infringer’s conduct created a likelihood of confusion
is at the heart of almost every trademark infringement dispute (with the
possible exception of cases brought by licensors against alleged former
licensees). Curiously (or perhaps not), each of the federal circuits has
developed its own multifactor test evaluating confusion.247 However, as the
Supreme Court indicated recently in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Industries, Inc.,248 in comparing the multifactor tests used in two circuits,
the substantive differences, if any, among the varying tests are likely
relatively minimal and not likely to be outcome determinative.249
Notably, the Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
organize the various factors cited in the cases (primarily derived from the
1938 Restatement (First) of Torts) and articulate a cohesive test for
likelihood of confusion. In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecronics Corp.,250
in an opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly, the court set forth for the first
time the eight factors (subsequently referred to as the Polaroid factors) to
be considered when addressing the question of likelihood of trademark
confusion.251 As Professor J. Thomas McCarthy makes clear in his
extensive discussion of the various circuit multifactor tests, the Polaroid
case is the earliest likelihood of confusion decision still remaining in force
today, predating the next earliest decision, In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co.,252 employed by the Federal Circuit, by over a decade.253 In this area,
also, it is fair to state that a Second Circuit decision carved a new path
forward on a critical issue in intellectual property law, one that has not
fundamentally changed in more than fifty-five years.
C. Challenges to Trademark Rights
in the E-Commerce Era
E-commerce, now ubiquitous, has unsurprisingly raised challenging
issues concerning the protection of intellectual property rights. In a lawsuit
brought by the owner of a tradition-laden famous brand, Tiffany Inc.,
against a contemporary, but similarly iconic, e-commerce brand, eBay, the
Second Circuit weighed in on the balance between protecting the
development of the e-commerce marketplace versus protecting the brands
sold there.254
In 2004, the world-famous producer and retailer of branded jewelry
asserted Lanham Act claims against the Internet auction site alleging,
247. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006).
248. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
249. Id. at 1307–09.
250. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
251. See id. at 495.
252. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
253. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 238, §§ 24:31–:43.
254. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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among other things, trademark infringement and dilution because large
quantities of purportedly “Tiffany” goods sold on eBay were, in actuality,
counterfeit.255 In the four-year period addressed in the lawsuit, eBay
generated over $4 million in revenue from the sale of Tiffany-branded
products, and it was not disputed that a “substantial” amount of the
“Tiffany” jewelry sold on eBay was counterfeit.256 At trial, eBay’s own
expert testified that 30 percent or more of the products could be deemed
counterfeit.257 Tiffany sought to hold eBay liable for, among other things,
direct and contributory trademark infringement and trademark dilution.258
After a nonjury trial, the district court decided for eBay on all claims and
Tiffany appealed.259
Citing the significant anticounterfeiting measures eBay had taken over
the years, the Second Circuit, in a decision by Judge Robert D. Sack,
affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to trademark
infringement and dilution.260 The court easily dispensed with the direct
claims, concluding that eBay had the right to use the Tiffany trademark to
describe genuine Tiffany goods sold on its website and that there could be
no dilution where eBay did not use Tiffany’s marks in association with
eBay’s own products.261
The more difficult issue, and a matter of first impression, was whether
eBay was accountable for the counterfeit sales on a contributory
infringement theory.262 That judicially created doctrine, rooted in tort law,
had been set forth at length by the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,263 in the context of manufacturers and
distributors.
Without deciding whether Inwood applied to service
providers, the Second Circuit noted that there were two ways for service
providers to be liable under the Inwood test: (1) if the provider
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark or (2) if the provider
continues to supply its service to one whom it knows or has reason to
believe is engaging in trademark infringement.264
Tiffany argued unsuccessfully that eBay was liable under the second
prong.265 According to the court, Tiffany failed to show that eBay was
supplying its services to individuals it knew or had reason to know were
selling counterfeits.266 Willful blindness, the court noted, is tantamount to
knowledge—but eBay, which had instituted numerous fraud-detection

255. See id. at 96.
256. See id. at 110.
257. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93.
258. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 101.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 114.
261. See id. at 103.
262. See id.
263. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
264. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 104.
265. See id. at 106–09.
266. See id. at 109.
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programs, did not act with willful blindness.267 The court held that to be
held liable for contributory infringement, a service provider must have more
than general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to
sell counterfeit goods.268 Rather, the service provider must have some
contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are or will infringe.269
In basing its decision on existing legal principles, and applying them to
new technologies, the court avoided the risk of disrupting the development
of new and developing forms of commerce. The decision reflected judicial
restraint, leaving the fashioning of new safeguards for brand holders, if
appropriate, to the legislative, political process.
D. Admissibility of Survey Evidence
in Lanham Act Cases
The use of survey evidence in Lanham Act lawsuits is not uncommon. In
the trademark area, surveys are often relied on to address the issue of
likelihood of confusion, as well as genericness and secondary meaning. In
false advertising cases, surveys can determine whether an advertisement
communicates an implied (nonliteral) message to the intended audience. As
a consequence of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,270 and its
progeny, including Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district courts are
authorized to act as gatekeepers with respect to all expert testimony.271
That necessarily led to the question of what the post-Daubert standards
would be for surveys offered in Lanham Act cases.
In the leading case addressing that issue, Schering Corp. v. Pfizer,
Inc.,272 in a comprehensive opinion by then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor, the
Second Circuit firmly established the majority rule that, generally, most
alleged defects in survey methodology go to the credibility, and not the
admissibility, of a survey, and thus in Lanham Act cases surveys should
rarely be excluded from evidence.273
Plaintiff Schering, the manufacturer of Claritin, concerned that a
competitor was misrepresenting the nonsedative properties of a competing
prescription drug, commissioned a survey among physicians that had been
visited by the competitor’s representatives.274 The survey allegedly
confirmed that false messages were being delivered, and Schering filed a
Lanham Act lawsuit that ended with a settlement.275 Schering then
conducted additional surveys to monitor compliance with the terms of the
settlement and filed a second lawsuit based on the survey results.276 In the
course of discovery, the plaintiff found surveys commissioned by the
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See id. at 109–10.
See id. at 107.
See id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
See id. at 224–27.
See id. at 221–23.
See id. at 222.
See id. at 222–23.
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competitor and moved for a preliminary injunction, citing in support a total
of five surveys.277 The district court granted defendants’ Daubert motion to
exclude the five surveys and denied the preliminary injunction.278
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that several of the surveys should
have been considered and remanded for reconsideration of the admissibility
of the others.279 To reach this result, then-Judge Sotomayor conducted an
exhaustive analysis of the exceptions to the hearsay rule that permitted
survey evidence to be admitted.280 On the issue of surveys considered
under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the court held that “errors in methodology . . . properly go only to
the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule 403’s more general
prohibition against evidence that is less probative than prejudicial or
confusing.”281
The principles set forth in Schering reflect the realities of survey practice
in Lanham Act cases. Every survey proffered by one party is inevitably
countered by the opposing party’s critiquing expert who pronounces the
survey fatally flawed. Thus, there is ample opportunity for the fact finder to
weigh and resolve the evidence on survey credibility or to simply ignore the
experts and decide the disputed issues based on other evidence.
One post-Daubert appellate decision, Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co.,282 had briefly considered the survey admissibility issue before the
Second Circuit, but the Schering decision, with its comprehensive analysis
of the hearsay issues and pre-Daubert precedent, is the leading case on the
admissibility of surveys in Lanham Act lawsuits. Professor McCarthy, for
example, cites to Schering in eight separate sections of his treatise. In all,
Schering has been cited almost 1,000 times. While other circuits follow the
majority rule set forth in Schering without necessarily citing the decision,283
district court decisions outside the Second Circuit frequently rely on it.284
E. The Territoriality Principle
and the Famous Marks Doctrine
Under the territoriality principle recognized by courts in the United
States (and generally around the world), a trademark has a separate legal
existence under each country’s laws.285 Therefore, ownership of a

277. See id. at 223.
278. See id. at 223–24.
279. See id. at 239–40.
280. See id. at 231–39.
281. Id. at 228.
282. 108 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 1997).
283. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013); PMG
Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011).
284. See Lear Auto. Dearborn, Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780–
81 (E.D. Mich. 2011); BoDeans Cone Co., L.L.C. v. Norse Dairy Sys., L.L.C., 678 F. Supp.
2d 883, 901–04 (N.D. Iowa 2009); United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d
884, 890–92 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
285. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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trademark in one country does not grant the owner any rights to the use of
that trademark in another.
Under the “famous marks” doctrine, however, a trademark that is neither
used nor registered in a country can still qualify for protection there if it is
“well known” among the relevant class of consumers. For example, when a
U.S. entity sought registration of the “Wimbledon” trademark for cologne
in the United States, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) held
that the operators of the Wimbledon Tennis Tournament in England had
standing to oppose the registration due to sufficient recognition of
“Wimbledon” by U.S. consumers, even though the trademark had not been
used or registered in the United States.286 Interestingly, the TTAB
grounded its holding in state unfair competition law, not trademark law.287
State courts have also applied the famous marks doctrine in the context of
Professor McCarthy has opined that
unfair competition claims.288
recognition by 50 percent of relevant consumers should be sufficient to
invoke the doctrine.289
No U.S. federal circuit court had ever endorsed the doctrine until 2004,
when the Ninth Circuit did so as a matter of federal trademark law in Grupo
Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,290 involving a chain of Mexican
grocery stores. Observing that the famous marks doctrine constituted “an
exception to the territoriality principle,” the court based its holding on
policy grounds, noting that “[a]n absolute territoriality rule without a
famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud.
Commerce crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants, so do people.”291
Three years later, the Second Circuit disagreed in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini,
Inc.,292 an opinion by Judge Reena Raggi. At issue in that case was the
“Bukhara” trademark for restaurants.293 Plaintiff in that case owned and
operated a renowned Bukhara restaurant in India, as well as several other
Bukhara restaurants in Asia.294 While it had also previously operated
Indian restaurants under the Bukhara trademark in both Manhattan and
Chicago, those had closed a number of years prior to the lawsuit, and the
mark in the United States was deemed abandoned.295 The dispute arose
when three former employees of the Bukhara restaurant in India opened two
Bukhara Grill restaurants in Manhattan, which “mimic[ed] the ITC
Bukhara’s logos, décor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and redcheckered customer bibs.”296
286. All Eng. Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, 220 U.S.P.Q. 1069,
1983 WL 51903 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
287. See id. at 1072, 1983 WL 51903, at *4.
288. See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (applying
New York common law).
289. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 238, § 29:4.
290. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
291. Id. at 1094.
292. 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
293. See id. at 142.
294. See id. at 142–43.
295. See id. at 144.
296. Id.
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In the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Raggi examined the history of the
territoriality principle, repeatedly emphasizing the absence of congressional
implementation of the doctrine through the Lanham Act.297 Explaining that
the famous marks doctrine originated from the 1925 addition of article 6bis
to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,298 the
court noted that the treaty was not self-executing and its terms had never
been given legal effect in the United States through implementing
legislation.299 Turning to the applicability of New York state court cases
that had adopted the famous marks doctrine, the court explained that the
cases were not grounded in trademark law, but entirely on New York
common law principles of unfair competition.300 And, because the TTAB
decisions affirming the doctrine were grounded in state law, the court
concluded that the doctrine “falls outside the sphere to which [the Second
Circuit] owe[s] deference.”301
Turning to the Ninth Circuit decision in Grupo Gigante, the court first
acknowledged that the famous marks doctrine had twice been considered in
the Second Circuit,302 noting that in one case the doctrine was inapplicable
because the plaintiff did not raise the issue,303 while in the other, the court
declined to address the doctrine because the Cuban plaintiff there was
barred by an embargo from acquiring property rights in the relevant
trademark.304 The court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and rejected the
doctrine under the Lanham Act because Congress had not incorporated the
substantive protections into the statute.305 The Supreme Court subsequently
declined review,306 there has been no action from Congress, and no circuit
outside of the Second or Ninth has addressed the issue.
In light of the Second Circuit’s holding in ITC, the famous marks
doctrine, which had arguably been considered an exception to the
territoriality principle for decades, now has an uncertain future in the United
States. The Second Circuit’s approach has certain doctrinal advantages, in
that multinational businesses are on notice that they must take steps to
protect their marks on the world market. The rejection of the famous marks
doctrine also eliminates a problematic legal theory that can be difficult to
apply, as evidenced by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Grupo Gigante, where
the court created a whole new category of mark strength which had
previously not existed, defined as something more than secondary meaning
but less than fame, requiring recognition by a substantial number of

297. See id. at 155–56.
298. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967).
299. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 161–62.
300. Id. at 157.
301. Id. at 159.
302. See id. at 160.
303. See id.; see also Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
304. See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 160; see also Empressa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro
Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 471 (2d Cir. 2005).
305. See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 163–64.
306. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. 827 (2007) (denying certiorari).
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consumers in the relevant U.S. market.307 Moreover, while much talked
about and perhaps more relevant in Europe, the doctrine had rarely been
used to protect marks in the United States. Finally, the court was careful to
not interfere with continued state law development and application of the
principle, and indeed obtained, via certification, a clarifying opinion on
state law from the New York Court of Appeals.308
F. Use of Survey Evidence to Address False Advertising Claims
in Lanham Act Lawsuits
There seems little doubt that the Lanham Act, adopted in 1948, was
considered by its drafters to be a trademark statute and that it was the
federal courts that developed what later became an extensive federal
common law that allowed a marketer to sue a competitor for alleged false or
misleading advertising.309 After a relatively lengthy period of slow
development, this area of federal jurisprudence began to grow significantly
in the 1980s. A database search shows that between the passage of the
Lanham Act and the Second Circuit’s decision in American Home Products
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,310 there were 56 cases discussing false
advertising in a Lanham Act context; between the court’s decision in 1978
and 2000, that number increased to 923 decisions.311 Contributing to this
trend, in 1978 the Second Circuit became the first federal appeals court to
put its imprimatur on the use of consumer survey evidence as a means of
showing that an advertisement that could be considered truthful when read
literally could nevertheless be actionable as misleading because it
communicated a false implied message.312
In American Home Products, two leading producers of over-the-counter
pain relief medications—American Home Products (AHP), the maker of
Anacin, and McNeil Laboratories, Inc. (“McNeil”), a subsidiary of Johnson
& Johnson and the maker of Tylenol—cross-appealed from a lower court
order enjoining AHP from making certain superiority claims.313 Anacin
contained aspirin and caffeine and had been, until supplanted by Tylenol,
the leading over-the-counter analgesic.314 The challenged AHP television
and magazine advertisements asserted Anacin’s superiority to Tylenol.315
Faced with McNeil’s protests to the major television networks, AHP filed a
declaratory judgment action.316 Relying heavily on a consumer survey of

307. See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
2004).
308. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 2007).
309. See Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 815–16 (1999).
310. 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978).
311. These figures come from a search on Westlaw Next.
312. See Am. Home Prods. Corp., 577 F.2d 160.
313. See id. at 162.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 162–63.
316. See id. at 163.
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analgesic purchasers exposed to the advertisements, McNeil counterclaimed
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.317
The district court relied primarily on consumer survey evidence in
finding that AHP’s television advertisement represented that Anacin is a
superior product generally and not superior only because Anacin reduced
inflammation while Tylenol did not.318 AHP appealed, arguing that
because its advertisements did not expressly claim that Anacin is a superior
analgesic to Tylenol, consumer survey evidence should not have been
considered.319
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge James L. Oakes, rejected
AHP’s contention that its advertisements were unambiguous and affirmed
the use of consumer survey evidence to interpret an ambiguous consumer
message.320 The Lanham Act’s reach, the court said, extends beyond literal
falsehoods to those statements that, despite being literally true, have a
tendency to mislead, confuse, or deceive consumers.321 The court found
that both the television and print advertisements used “pain” and
“inflammation” to ambiguous effect, and thus the lower court properly
looked to consumer response data to determine what meaning was actually
communicated.322 According to the court, the district judge was not only
warranted in looking to the consumer survey evidence but, given the
ambiguity of the advertisements’ messages, “may have been compelled” to
do so—thus underlining the importance of survey evidence in determining
what messages advertisements convey to the relevant consumer
population.323
Following the American Home Products decision, the use of consumer
communication surveys in Lanham Act false advertising lawsuits in short
order became a standard strategic option.
G. Dilution Principles
According to a leading scholar and professor, the concept of dilution has
created more “doctrinal puzzlement and judicial incomprehension” than any
other aspect of trademark law.324 Dilution is a doctrine that protects rights
in famous marks and does not require evidence of consumer confusion.325
In the United States, the development of the doctrine dates from a muchcited Harvard Law Review article written by Frank I. Schechter.326

317. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
318. See Am. Home Prods. Corp., 577 F.2d at 163–64.
319. See id. at 164.
320. See id. at 164–67.
321. See id. at 166.
322. See id. at 166–67.
323. See id. at 166.
324. J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law
Compared, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1163 (2005).
325. See id. at 1166.
326. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813 (1927).
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For several decades following the Schechter article, a number of states
adopted antidilution statutes, but the doctrine did not become a subject of
significant litigation until Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995327 (FTDA), codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125.328 Shortly after its
adoption, the Supreme Court nullified the usefulness of the statute by
interpreting it literally,329 and Congress passed the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006330 (TDRA), to put life back into the statute.
While the Second Circuit has decided a number of cases during the
evolution of trademark dilution law, two are worth noting: Deere & Co. v.
MTD Products Inc.331 and Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee,
Inc.332 Before there was a federal statute, Deere & Company, a
manufacturer of agricultural machinery and other equipment, prevailed in
establishing dilution under New York law.333 Deere sought a nationwide
injunction, but the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jon O. Newman,
disagreed.334 The court noted that New York’s antidilution statute differed
from other states’ statutes, and therefore there was no basis to issue a
nationwide injunction.335 Thus, the decision highlighted the anomaly of
state dilution laws being relied on to protect nationally famous marks.
During the period between the initial adoption of the federal statute and
the 2006 revision, courts developed standards for proving a likelihood of
dilution because the FTDA had not set forth any such standards. A number
of courts had held that to establish a likelihood of dilution, the plaintiff
needed to show that the two marks were substantially similar. In the
TDRA, Congress set forth specific factors to be considered for proving a
likelihood of dilution, one of which is the “similarity between the
mark[s].”336
In Starbucks, the Second Circuit was the first appellate court to interpret
the revised Act.337 In an opinion by Judge Roger J. Miner, the court held
that the statute did not require substantial similarity.338 The court noted that
the TDRA sets forth a six-factor test for dilution by blurring, and did not
include a requirement of substantial similarity.339 Therefore, the mere lack
of substantial similarity was not sufficient to dismiss dilution claims.340

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 238 § 24:67.
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.
41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d 39.
See id. at 46–47.
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
Starbucks, 588 F.3d 97.
Id. at 107.
See id. at 108–10.
See id.
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Two years after this opinion, the next time a court of appeals addressed the
issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation.341
As can be seen from the discussion above, while influential Second
Circuit decisions in the trademark, dilution, and false advertising areas are
not as abundant as in the copyright area, the Second Circuit has
nevertheless been a thought leader in these areas.
III. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
To celebrities, the right of publicity can be an extremely valuable
personal asset, as is evident from common advertising campaigns, such as a
sports drink promoted by a prominent athlete, as well as the numerous
lawsuits seeking to protect that right. The term “right of publicity” dates to
a pivotal 1953 Second Circuit decision.342
A. Creation of the Right of Publicity
Many states recognize the right of publicity by statute or by common law
development. Noteworthy right of publicity cases include the famous
singer Bette Midler successfully prosecuting a right of publicity claim
against an advertiser who used a soundalike who replicated her vocal
In another case, the well-recognized “Here’s Johnny”
styling.343
introductory phrase to Johnny Carson’s Tonight Show was found to violate
Carson’s rights when used in an advertisement for portable restrooms.344
Historically, the right of publicity evolved from privacy theory. In 1890,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis outlined a novel legal theory that
promoted a limited application of privacy rights (“the right to be let alone”)
in their famous Harvard Law Review essay.345 In 1903, New York adopted
the nation’s first right of privacy statute, N.Y. Civil Rights Law sections 49
and 50, following the New York Court of Appeals’s rejection of the
theory.346 In the years following, the right of privacy led to many cases
brought by celebrity plaintiffs, but privacy law proved inadequate to
accommodate “uncompensated, rather than unwelcome publicity.”347
In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,348 Haelan, the
plaintiff gum manufacturer, had secured the exclusive right to use the
images of a celebrated baseball player on its baseball cards.349 The

341. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1172–73
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting the Second Circuit’s language in Starbucks).
342. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).
343. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
344. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
345. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
346. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
347. Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights:
An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 622 (1984).
348. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
349. See id. at 867.
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defendant, Topps Chewing Gum, was a competing gum manufacturer that
wanted to use the baseball player’s image for its advertisements.350
The court in Haelan, in an opinion by Judge Jerome N. Frank, ruled for
the plaintiff, holding that a natural person has a right in the publicity value
of his or her photograph, independent of the right to privacy, and that “this
right might be called a right of publicity.”351 That right, the court
explained, afforded a person the same benefits as with any other property
right, namely that the right is exclusive, assignable, and descendible.352
Judge Frank’s articulation thus established the rationale for the
development of the right of publicity, as an adjunct to, but also independent
of, the statutory right of privacy.
B. Standards for Resolving Disputes Between the Right
of Publicity and Competing First Amendment Rights
As it has developed and expanded, the right of publicity has raised
complex issues concerning the tension between the exercise of First
Amendment rights versus an individual’s control over the commercial use
of his or her identity. This tension was examined in the seminal case
Rogers v. Grimaldi.353 Noted actress Ginger Rogers asserted a right of
publicity, as well as Lanham Act false endorsement claims, against the
producers and distributors of famed director Federico Fellini’s movie
“Ginger and Fred.”354 The film told the story of two fictional Italian
cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and her frequent film partner, Fred
Astaire.355 Rogers alleged that the movie title violated, among other things,
her right of publicity.356
In the district court, Judge Robert W. Sweet granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants.357 In an opinion by Judge Jon O. Newman
affirming the district court, the Second Circuit noted that “suppressing an
artistically relevant though ambiguous[ly] title[d]” film on trademark
grounds would “unduly restrict expression.”358 The Rogers court fashioned
a test for artistic titles—the artist is free to use a personal name of a
celebrity in a movie title unless the use “has no artistic relevance to the
underlying work whatsoever,”359 or is “simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”360 The court also set forth
a comparable test for alleged false endorsement.361
350. See id.
351. Id. at 868.
352. See id. at 868–69.
353. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
354. See id. at 996.
355. See id. at 996–97.
356. See id. at 997.
357. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994.
358. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001.
359. Id. at 999.
360. Id. at 1004 (quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S. 2d 828, 829 (App.
Div. 1980)).
361. See id. at 999.
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Rogers has been applied widely outside the Second Circuit (albeit more
often in the false endorsement context), in decisions expanding the Rogers
standards well beyond film titles. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, applied
Rogers to a book title.362 The Ninth Circuit went further and applied the
Rogers formulation to a case involving the use of a trademark in the body
of a work.363 The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers test to a nontitle element
of a work in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.364
IV. PRE-FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT DECISIONS
WORTHY OF NOTE
It has been more than thirty years since intermediate appellate
jurisdiction for patent cases was consolidated in the Federal Circuit, which
was created for that purpose. Pre-Federal Circuit cases, nevertheless, are
still of precedential value and a number are still influential—or at least
worth noting—including the four Second Circuit decisions discussed below.
A. Defining a Printed Publication
Semantics are at the heart of patent law. Every patent case revolves
around parsing the meaning of words in the patent claims and, in turn,
parsing the words of the applicable patent statute. Despite several major
modifications to the patent laws since the decision issued in 1928, Judge
Learned Hand’s analysis of what constitutes a “printed publication” in
Jockmus v. Leviton,365 remains authoritative.
Of particular significance is Judge Hand’s distinction between the
physical nature of a publication and the manner of its dissemination:
A single copy in a library, though more permanent, is far less fitted to
inform the craft than a catalogue freely circulated, however ephemeral its
existence; for the catalogue goes direct to those whose interests make
them likely to observe and remember whatever it may contain that is new
and useful.366

In a modern world in which “publications” may be increasingly ephemeral
(e.g., tweets and blogs), Judge Hand’s reasoning enjoys continuing vitality
and respect.
B. Benefits of a Specialized Court
Two other decisions authored by Judge Learned Hand are striking for
their foreshadowing of a debate that continues to this day:
the
appropriateness of having technical patent disputes resolved by lay judges
362. Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999).
363. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.
2008) (video game content).
364. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit concluded that Tiger Woods’s right
of publicity was not compromised by the creation and distribution of a painting
commemorating Woods winning the 1997 Masters of Augusta tournament. Id. at 937.
365. 28 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1928).
366. Id. at 813–14.
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and juries. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.367 was the central
precedent for patentability of DNA sequences for over 100 years before the
Supreme Court reversed course in 2013.368 Displaying unwarranted
humility, Judge Hand lamented the “extraordinary condition of the law
which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the
rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.”369 Mirroring
the arguments of current proponents for specialized patent courts, Judge
Hand pointed to the approach of German courts, in which then, as now, the
court of first instance in patent cases is comprised of a panel of specialized
judges who may further call upon technical experts to advise the court.370
Forty years later, Judge Hand, at that time on the Second Circuit, reprised
that concern in Reiner v. I. Leon Co.371 Reiner addressed the so-called
“sign posts”372 that are useful in determining whether a patent is obvious,
which were later referenced in Graham v. John Deere Co.,373 as “legal
inferences or subtests [that] focus attention on economic and motivational
rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial
treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent
litigation.”374 Posited in part as a safeguard against the “ignorance” of the
judicial fact finder, Judge Hand’s “sign posts”—now more commonly
referred to as “secondary considerations” or “objective indicia”—have
stood the test of time and remain a central precept of analyzing patent
obviousness defenses.
C. Determining a Reasonable Royalty
There is arguably no more prolific citation in patent litigation than
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc.,375 cited
over 500 times in cases and secondary sources. Ask any patent litigator
what the “Georgia-Pacific factors” are and the lawyer will recite a litany of
elements to be considered in assessing what constitutes a “reasonable
royalty” to compensate for patent infringement.
While the oft-quoted factors were actually enumerated in the district
court’s decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,376 the
Second Circuit’s treatment of that decision on appeal, authored by Judge
Wilfred Feinberg, is notable for several reasons. First and foremost, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s methodology in assessing the
appropriate royalty amount,377 absent which it is doubtful whether Georgia367. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
368. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
369. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 115.
370. See id.
371. 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960).
372. Id. at 504.
373. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
374. Id. at 35–36.
375. 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
376. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295.
377. See Ga.-Pac. Corp., 446 F.2d at 297.
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Pacific would have become the leading authority that it remains. Second,
the court’s conclusion that evidence postdating the hypothetical royalty
negotiation date is entitled to diminished weight378 remains the law of the
land today, albeit one that is subject to heated debate. Third and finally, the
ubiquity of the district court’s factors overshadows the fact that the Second
Circuit found reversible error in the amount of royalty assessed by the
district court.379
D. Forerunner to the eBay Doctrine
The patent community collectively gasped when the Supreme Court ruled
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,380 that patentees are not automatically
entitled to an injunction following the establishment of a valid claim of
infringement.381 Patent owners continue to grumble that the Supreme Court
in eBay vitiated the constitutional “exclusive right” that flows from the
ownership of a patent.382 But over twenty years earlier, the Second Circuit
foreshadowed the current state of the law in Foster v. American Machine &
Foundry Co.383 Affirming the district court, the Second Circuit, in an
opinion by then-District Court Judge Murray I. Gurfein, sitting by
designation, held that “[a]n injunction to protect a patent against
infringement, like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be
determined by the circumstances.”384 The decision to uphold denial of
injunctive relief—and the imposition of a compulsory license—turned on
the fact that “the [infringer] manufactures a product; the [patentee] does
not.”385 Thus, revisiting Foster reveals not only that the Supreme Court
was not breaking new ground with eBay, but also that today’s concern with
“nonpracticing entities” asserting patents for money alone is by no means a
new one.
CONCLUSION
The different substantive areas covered in this Article are not part of one
overarching jurisprudence but, rather, are distinct areas with their own
policies and intricacies, primarily joined together by the common feature
that the property involved is not tangible. For this reason, it would be
difficult to try to draw broad-based conclusions from the cases cited. We
do note that while one of the Second Circuit decisions discussed is more
than 100 years old, and others were decided several decades ago, a number
378. See id.
379. See id. at 302.
380. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
381. See id. at 393–94.
382. See, e.g., Paul M. Mersino, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay
Auction Away a Patent Holder’s Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 333, 339
(2007); Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Court’s eBay Decision Sets Back
Pesky ‘Patent Trolls’ or American Innovation, Depending upon Which Side You’re On, 92
A.B.A. J. 51, 52 (2006).
383. 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974).
384. Id. at 1324.
385. Id.
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are relatively recent—indeed, in the case of the Capitol Records decision,
current. Notwithstanding the demographic changes in America, the Second
Circuit is well positioned to continue in the coming decades to be a leader
in the development of U.S. intellectual property law.

